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Abstract
This paper provides a simple autonomy-based model of human motivation in which
a decision maker with divided selves must perform some task. The key presumption of
the model is that the brain is not a unitary system which is equipped to achieve a single
goal in a systematic manner; rather, it is more like an organizationwhich is hampered by
several constraints such as preference incongruence and incomplete exchange (or imper-
fect recall) of information. Due to these constraints, the model yields behavioral patterns
that are consistent with various stylized facts of human motivation, mostly found in so-
cial psychology. The main findings of the paper are: (i) more autonomy induces more
motivation; (ii) complex tasks are susceptible to motivation crowding out; (iii) small re-
wards are detrimental to motivation; (iv) intrinsically interesting tasks are susceptible to
motivation crowding out.
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1 Introduction
In economics, the term “incentive” is almost a synonym to motivation, and the distinction
between them is rarely made clear. Economists typically emphasize the role of incentives
in guiding and shaping human behavior without making much reference to motivation per
se, as if they are simply two different ways of representing the same thing. This is prob-
ably due to the fact that economists are primarily concerned about extrinsic motivation –
the side of human motivation which is induced by external enforcers, or “incentives,” such
as contingent rewards, monitoring, surveillance and evaluation.1 To the extent that there
exists a one-to-one monotonic relationship between motivation and incentives, the distinc-
tion between them is merely semantic and mixing them up does not lead to any substantial
complications.
The problem is that human motivation is a far more complicated subject, and extrinsic
motivation seems to represent only a part of it. It is now widely accepted, not only among
social psychologists but also increasingly among economists, that to fully understand hu-
man motivation, one needs to understand the workings of intrinsic motivation, which arises
from sheer pleasure of engaging in an activity itself, as well as those of extrinsic motivation.
To further complicate the issue, abundance of evidence also suggests that these two concepts
of motivation do not exist in isolation: there seem to exist substantial interactions between
the two, where a change in one often leads to a change in the other. These findings imply that
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are not additive in nature, and focusing solely on extrin-
sic motivation, with no specific reference to intrinsic motivation, might lead to misleading
predictions.
What we need is then a description of the underlying mechanism that can explain how
intrinsic motivation interacts with extrinsic motivation. To this end, although there seems
to exist no unified theory of human motivation to date, the recent literature in social psy-
1Of course, the distinction between motivation and incentive would ultimately come down to howwe define
them. A conventional view is probably that incentive is a means (to induce motivation) whereas motivation is
an end. According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, for instance, it is defined as “a thing that motivates or
encourages someone to do something.” We take this view throughout the paper although we interchangeably
use extrinsic rewards and incentives.
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chology indicates several consistent patterns observed in a variety of settings, which poten-
tially provide us with an angle to inquire into this issue. First, it is now well known and
firmly established that external enforcers, such as rewards, surveillance, competition and
evaluation, often undermine intrinsic motivation, thereby yielding a counterproductive ef-
fect (Deci, 1971; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997). Second, many studies also point out that
autonomy, such as control over method or timing and discretion in setting goals, is a key
determinant of intrinsic motivation (Hackman and Oldham, 1976; Gagne and Deci, 2005).
Although this second fact is less known than the first, various sources argue that people
tend to be more intrinsically motivated in doing an activity when it is their independent
and “self-determined” choice to do so. Third, the saliency of intrinsic motivation depends
on the type of task people do. In particular, intrinsic motivation seems to matter more for
non-routine tasks, e.g., complex tasks or tasks that require creativity (Amabile et al., 1990;
Oldham and Cummings, 1996). Forth, the hidden cost of incentives seems to be more salient
when extrinsic rewards are relatively small inmagnitude (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a). Fi-
nally, the hidden cost is more likely to surface when the target task is intrinsically interesting
(Ryan et al., 1983; Deci et al., 1999).
In this paper, we construct a simple dual-self model of human motivation which is par-
simonious and tractable enough to capture these observations. The key presumption of the
model is that the brain is not a unitary system that is equipped to achieve a single goal in a
cohesive manner; rather, it is like an organization which is hampered by various constraints
such as preference incongruence and incomplete exchange (or imperfect recall) of informa-
tion.2 We consider a decision maker (DM) with divided selves, called Cognition and Affect,
who must perform some task. Cognition is the sophisticated self who is endowed with
cognitive ability to evaluate alternatives and make choice, whereas Affect is the primitive
and instinctive self who is endowed with motivational or affective energy to carry out an
action.3 These differences in cognitive and affective characteristics give rise to the following
2One of the earliest works to model intrapersonal conflicts is Thaler and Shefrin (1981). Recently, there are
increasingly many works which model a decision maker with divided selves. See Benabou and Tirole (2004),
Bernheim and Rangel (2004), Fudenberg and Levine (2005) and Brocas and Carrillo (2008) for recent examples.
3This mean that Affect must take some initiative for one to produce an action. On this point, Camerer (2005)
et al. note “our view is that cognition by itself cannot produce action; to influence behavior, the cognitive system
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three features of the model.
• Decentralization/specialition: There are two stages in implementing an action: the
planning stage (what to do) and the implementation stage (whether to do it). This
sequence of choices is made in a decentralized way, where Cognition (mostly) does
the first while Affect does the second.
• Incomplete information: The values, both extrinsic and intrinsic, of the action chosen
in the first stage are not accessible to Affect who must infer them from the primitives
of the environment.
• Preference incongruence: Cognition is more patient and forward-looking than Affect,
because it requires a certain level of cognitive ability to expect and appreciate potential
consequences of an action. This difference in time preferences effectively results in a
conflict of interests between them, because the extrinsic and intrinsic values typically
realize at different points in time.
To be more precise, the model goes as follows. In the first stage, either Cognition or
Affect chooses an action to implement from a set of feasible alternatives, each of which is
characterized by its intrinsic and extrinsic values. Initiative in this stage can be taken by
either agent, depending on the complexity of the target task. In the second, Affect then
decides whether to actually carry out the action chosen previously. The problem is that,
due to the incomplete exchange or imperfect recall of information, it is not clear to Affect
why that particular action was chosen in the first place and hence how rewarding the action
is to him. Environmental factors, such as the degree of autonomy given to DM, rewards
associated with the task, and the nature of the task, may then influence DM’s motivation
as represented by Affect’s effort choice. Using this framework, we obtain conditions under
which those environmental factors raise or undermine DM’s motivation.
The paper is related to several strands of literature, both in social psychology and eco-
nomics. The entire framework relies heavily on an insight developed in Self-Perception
must operate via the affective system.”
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Theory (Bem, 1972).4 The theory posits that our attitudes and feelings are often uncertain
and, when they are, we make an inference about these states by observing our past behav-
iors and the situation in which it occurs. To the extent that this holds true, external enforcers
can inflict a negative impact on our intrinsic motivation. For instance, when people are paid
to do an activity, they reason in retrospect that they do it because of the reward that they
get. The unfortunate consequence is that when that happens, people often lose their interest
in the activity which they initially do it for its own sake. In social psychology, this is often
called the overjustification effect: extrinsic enforcers make them underestimate the intrinsic
value of the activity. Alternatively, Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) argues that exter-
nal enforcers diminish feelings of autonomy and undermine intrinsic motivation through a
change in perceived locus of causality (PLOC) from internal to external. Notmuch is known,
however, about the underlying mechanism that gives rise to the overjustification effect or
a shift of PLOC. It is in particular not clear why we ever need to overjustify, rather than
simply justify, our originating motives. Constructing a simple autonomy-based model, we
provide a microfoundation for what appears to be overjustification.
Recently, the role of intrinsic motivation in general and the “hidden cost of rewards and
incentives” in particular draw attention from economists as well and are discussed rather
extensively (Kreps, 1997; Frey, 1997; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000a, 2000b; Fehr and List, 2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).5 Theoretical investigations of
the hidden cost of incentives have also flourished. In a setting with an informed principal,
Benabou and Tirole (2003) show that contingent rewards may be counterproductive since
those rewards are taken as a signal about undesirable features of the task to be performed.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) argue that rewards diminish the incentive for prosocial behavior
because they undermine its signaling value. Sliwka (2007) considers a setting where some
fraction of agents are conformists who derive utility from conforming to others. When those
4Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) provide a model with potential memory loss (actions are remembered well
but information signals are not) which is related to Self-Perception Theory when it is brought into an individ-
ual decision problem. They then show when the decision maker exhibits excess inertia (insensitivity to new
information) and excess impulsiveness (excess sensitivity to new information). Benabou and Tirole (2004) also
consider a case where past attitudes are not certain and inferences must be made from past actions.
5Also see Frey (2001) for a survey.
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agents do not know what fraction of agents are fair, trust emerges as a signal that most
agents are indeed fair, and the principal may choose to trust, rather than control, agents.
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) consider a similar setting to Benabou and Tirole (2006)
but assume that the payoff of social esteem depends on the audience to whom the agent
tires to impress. In that setting, they show that material incentives erode esteem incentives
especially when the principal has a choice of incentive scheme.
All of thesemodelsmentioned above are concerned about interpersonal situationswhere
things such as trust and esteemmatter. In contrast, we focus on an intrapersonal mechanism
of motivation crowding out as an alternative route. Since most experimental results are ob-
tained in controlled laboratory environments, where interactions are mostly anonymous and
social incentives are supposedly less renounced, we argue that the intrapersonal perspective
can provide an insight that can complement the existing literature which focuses more on
social incentives.6
The paper proceeds as follows. We outline the model in section 2 and analyze it in
section 3. In section 4, we discuss main results of the model, especially when and under
what conditions motivation crowding out occurs in this context. Finally, we offer some
concluding remarks in section 5.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a two-stage model between agent C (cognition, she) and agent A (affect, he).
These two selves altogether comprise a decision maker (DM) who must engage in some
task, which we call the target task. The decisions are made in a hierarchical and sequential
manner, where an action is chosen in the first (planning) stage and is implemented in the
second (implementation) stage.
First stage: In the first stage, DM “finds” or “invents” an action to be implemented. The
6To clarify our stance in the paper, we do not mean to argue that interpersonal models cannot explain exper-
imental results observed in laboratory settings. We do believe that social incentives work, either consciously or
subconsciously, in those settings to some extent. See Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) for a discussion on this
issue. Our approach is hence not exclusive: there are many factors that come into play on this issue of human
motivation, and the intrapersonal mechanism which we illustrate here possibly provides one such factor.
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task in this context represents a (vague) goal that DM would like to achieve (such as “sell
more” or “raise revenue”) whereas the action represents a particular way to achieve it (how
to proceed the task). Initiative in this stage can be taken by either agent A or agent C,
depending on the complexity of the task. We assume that agent C is called upon to make
this choice with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] which measures the complexity of the target task: ρ
is closer to one when the task is more complex and requires more cognitive resources; it is
closer to zero when it is simpler and/or more routine.
Every possible action is completely characterized by its values (v, y), where v and y
refer to the intrinsic and extrinsic values, respectively. The extrinsic value reflects a material
benefit of the action and is often associated with an observable consequence of the action,
e.g., the level of observable output, which takes some time to materialize. In contrast, the
intrinsic value refers to other immediate gains that are intrinsic to the environment or to
the action itself, such as the sense of achievement, responsibility, and job satisfaction which
typically comes from inside DM.
While there are presumably many ways to model this process of “inventing” an action,
we adopt an approach that is amenable to the standard consumption-choice framework.
Suppose that each agent is endowed with some cognitive resource R which the agent in
charge can allocate at his/her disposal. The agent must expend more resources to find an
action with higher values, so that the cost of coming up with an action with (v, y) is simply
given by d(v+ y) where d > 0 is some constant. The values can only be improved so that
(v, y) ∈ R2+. Define r := R/d as the parameter capturing the degree of autonomy given
to DM. The basic idea is that the larger r is, the larger the set from which DM chooses an
action. In the most extreme case where DM is given no autonomy at all (r = 0), she has no
choice but to implement the default action, possibly assigned by an outsider, whose values
are normalized at (0, 0).
Second stage: After the action is chosen, agent A chooses the effort level e ∈ R+. The
(motivational) cost of effort, which is incurred entirely by agent A, is given by e2/2. What is
critical here is that the values of the chosen action is not accessible to agent A, either because
it is simply forgotten or because there is no established channel of communication between
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the two selves.
2.2 Payoffs
The key to the entire analysis is the misalignment of preferences between the two selves.
In particular, we would like to emphasize the difference in time preferences between them,
which originates from the difference in cognitive ability to evaluate potential future conse-
quences of an action. We assume that agent C is more patient and forward-looking than
agent A because agent C can foresee future consequences better.7 This difference in time
horizon matters because each value materializes at different points in time. The intrinsic
value tends to be realized more immediately than the extrinsic value because it stemsmostly
from sheer pleasure of performing the task itself. In contrast, the extrinsic value takes more
time to materialize because it is contingent on the observable consequence of the action
which may not be immediately available.
We specify each agent’s preferences under this presumption. Given the values of the
action and the effort level, the payoff for agent C is given by
UC(v, y, e) = uC(v,wy)e,
where w ∈ R+ is the incentive rate which may be imposed from outside. The incentive
rate is the parameter of our utmost concern and should be interpreted broadly: it is meant
to capture the salience of contingent rewards and punishments, surveillance, monitoring,
evaluation and so on. The payoff for agent A is, on the other hand, given by
UA(v, y, e) = uA(v,wy)e−
e2
2
,
We make the following assumptions on the payoff functions.
Assumption 1 The payoff functions uj : R2+ → R+, j = A,C, are twice continuously differen-
tiable and satisfy the following properties:
(i) u
j
1 > 0, u
j
2 > 0, u
j
11 < 0, u
j
22 < 0;
(ii) limv→0 u
j
1 = ∞ and limy→0 u
j
2 = ∞.
7There is ample evidence that long-term and short-term rewards are processes in different regions of the
brain. Also, Dohmen et al. (2010) show the correlation between cognitive ability and patience, implying that
cognition plays some role in evaluating long-term rewards.
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Assumption 2 For any (v, y) and w,
MRSA :=
uA1
uA2
> MRSC :=
uC1
uC2
,
Assumption 2 is particularly important, which states that at any combination of the values,
agent A is always more willing to trade the extrinsic value (a future benefit) for the intrinsic
value (an immediate benefit) than agent C, capturing the idea that agent C is more patient
and forward-looking.
3 The analysis
3.1 The second stage
Since agent A has no recollection of what has happened in the first stage, she must make
an inference from the primitives of the model environment about the values of the chosen
action. Let (vˆj, yˆj), j = A,C, denote the expected choice of the values when the choice is
made by agent j. Agent A’s problem in the second stage is then defined as
max
e
[ρuA(vˆC,wyˆC) + (1− ρ)uA(vˆA,wyˆA)]e−
e2
2
.
The optimal effort, denoted by e∗, is given by
e∗ = uˆA(ρ) := ρuA(vˆC,wyˆC) + (1− ρ)uA(vˆA,wyˆA).
Of course, in equilibrium, these expected choices must coincide with the actual choices.
3.2 The first stage
Let (vj, yj) denote the actual choice of the values when it is made by agent j. When agent j
is called upon to make the choice, the agent solves
max
(vj,yj)
uj(vj,wyj)uˆA(ρ),
subject to
vj + yj ≤ r :=
R
d
.
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Since u is non-satiated, one can immediately see that the cognitive resource constraint al-
ways binds at the maximum. The first-order condition is given by
u
j
1− wu
j
2 = 0, (1)
i.e., the values are chosen so as to satisfy MRSj = w if there exists an interior solution. Note
that under Assumption 1, an interior solution always exists, where the optimal solution can
be written as vj(r,w) and yj(r,w).
Define ujk := uj(vk,wyk), u
jk
1 := u
j
1(v
k,wyk), u
jk
2 := u
j
2(v
k,wyk) and so on. Then, (1)
implies
uAC1
uAC2
> w =
uAA1
uAA2
.
Figure 1 illustrates this for two extreme cases (ρ = 0 and ρ = 1).8 Define
µ(r,w) :=
uAC1
uAC2
=
uA1 (v
C(r,w),wyC(r,w))
uA2 (v
C(r,w),wyC(r,w))
,
whichwe use as ameasure of the degree of preference incongruence between the two agents.
The preferences are identical when µ(r,w) = w for any (r,w) and become more divergent
as µ(r,w) becomes larger.
[Figure 1 about here]
4 What factors enhance (or diminish) motivation
The present framework allows us to examine how a change in the underlying environment
influences DM’s motivation which is directly represented by e∗ = uˆA(ρ).
4.1 Autonomy
While the role of autonomy in inducing motivation is less discussed in economics, many
theoretical hypotheses argue and corresponding experimental results suggest that auton-
omy plays a decisive role in determining the level of human motivation: people tend to be
8The first-stage problem is equivalent to maxv,y u
j(v, y) subject to v+ y/w ≤ r. The figures are illustrated
this way, where the slope of the cognitive resource constraint is equal to −w.
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more intrinsically motivated in doing an activity when it is their independent choice to do
so. For instance, Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) argues that external enforcers diminish
feelings of autonomy and undermine intrinsic motivation through a change in perceive lo-
cus of causality (PLOC) from internal to external. In contrast, giving choice about aspects of
task engagement tends to enhance feelings of autonomy, prompting PLOC from external to
internal. Similarly, Self-Determination Theory, a revised and broader version of Cognitive
Evaluation Theory, clearly identifies autonomy as a driving force of humanmotivation.9 Job
Characteristic Theory also emphasizes autonomy as one of five important characteristics to
enhance motivation (Hackman and Oldham, 1976). These theories imply that the allocation
of authority and control right has some impacts on workers’ motivation in a way that is not
typically considered in economics.
We now examine how a change in the degree of autonomy r affects DM’s motivation. To
this end, it is convenient to establish the following notion.
Definition 1 The intrinsic value is a normal good for agent C iff ∂vC/∂r > 0.
It is widely accepted that most goods are indeed normal, implying that the condition should
not be particularly restrictive: in fact, this property holds for a wide class of preferences,
such as CES, typically used in economic analyses. When this condition is satisfied, we can
establish the following result.
Proposition 1 An increase in r raises DM’s motivation (the equilibrium effort level e∗) if the in-
trinsic value is a normal good.
PROOF: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result should be clear and obvious. It simply says that agent
A, who has no recollection of what has happened in the first stage, can reason that an action
which is chosen from a wider set of alternatives is more likely to be of some value. In
contrast, when DM is given less autonomy, an action is expected to be imposed more from
9See, for instance, Gagne and Deci (2005) for a survey.
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outside and there is little reason to believe that it accords well with agent A’s preferences.
Figure 2 illustrates this when ρ = 0. In the figure, an increase in r raises Agent C’s payoff
level from u¯C0 to u¯
C
1 and moves the equilibrium point accordingly. One can see that this
change induces more motivation from agent A as her payoff level improves at this new
equilibrium point.
[Figure 2 about here]
4.2 Extrinsic rewards
We now turn to the main focus of the analysis, i.e., the effect of a change in extrinsic rewards
on motivation. For expositional purposes, we say that motivation crowding out occurs if
an increase in w reduces the equilibrium effort level e∗ or, equivalently, agent A’s expected
payoff. There is now abundance of evidence which documents the undermining effect of
extrinsic rewards (the case of motivation crowding out), both in social psychology and eco-
nomics. The previous findings are so overwhelming that the relevant question to be asked is
not whether this undermining effect exists, but when and under what conditions the effect
is more likely to surface. In what follows, we raise several factors and discuss them in turn.
4.2.1 Complex tasks are susceptible to motivation crowding out
Cognition plays a larger role in choosing what to do when the task at hand is complicated
and/or requires creativity in some sense. A number of observations in fact suggest that
intrinsic motivation matters more for those complex, non-routine, tasks. First, many argue
that high intrinsic motivation is a necessary ingredient for achieving creativity (Amabile,
1996; Shalley and Oldham, 1997). Moreover, it is also suggested that the complexity of tasks
and intrinsic motivation (and creativity) are closely connected (Amabile, 1996; Boomer and
Jalajas, 2002; Hackman and Oldham, 1980). Given this nature, it is understandable that
motivation crowding out is more salient for complex tasks or tasks that require creativity.
Amabile et al. (1990) show that external factors such as evaluation and competition can be
detrimental to creativity. McGraw and McCullers (1979) find that monetary rewards also
diminish cognitive flexibility in problem solving while Erez et al. (1990) find that monetary
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rewards diminish performance on a complex task with difficult goals. Of course, complex
tasks and tasks that require creativity are not always the same. Baer et al. (2003) show that
extrinsic rewards lower creativity for employees in complex tasks. All of these studies indi-
cate that extrinsic rewards make people think that they perform the task for the rewards that
they get, thereby inhibiting intrinsic motivation that is necessary for enhancing performance
in complex tasks.
To examine the undermining effect of extrinsic rewards, it is convenient to use the fol-
lowing notion.
Definition 2 The intrinsic and extrinsic values are gross substitutes for agent C if ∂vC/∂w < 0.
Two goods are said to be gross substitutes if the Marshallian demand for one good increases
when the price of the other good increases.10 Again, the condition for gross substitutability
is not particularly restrictive: in the case of preferences represented by CES, the goods are
gross substitutes if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one.
In the present context, the complexity of the task is measured by ρ, where a larger ρ
means that the target task is more complicated and hence agent C is more likely to take
over the decision-making process. We then obtain the following result which shows that
motivation crowding out is more likely for complex, non-routine, tasks.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (i) the values are gross substitutes and (ii) the preferences are suffi-
ciently divergent, i.e., µ(r,w) is sufficiently large. Then, motivation crowding out occurs if ρ is
sufficiently close to one.
PROOF: See Appendix.
[Figure 3 about here]
The proposition indicates that motivation crowding out is more likely to occur when
the preferences are divergent (a large µ) and the target task is relatively complex (a large
10Since the price of the extrinsic value can be regarded as 1/w, the two values are gross substitutes for agent
C if ∂vC/∂w < 0.
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ρ). These conditions are closely related and complementary to each other. When the task
is simple and the first-stage choice is made by agent A, there is little room for preference
incongruence to play any role, meaning that motivation crowding out is less likely to occur.
In contrast, as the task becomes more complicated, an increase in w sways the choice exces-
sively towards the extrinsic value (overjustification), from the viewpoint of AgentA, thereby
lowering her subsequent payoff. The following result establishes necessary conditions for
motivation crowding out in the current context.
Proposition 3 Motivation crowding out never occurs if ρ = 0 or µ(r,w) = w for all (r,w).
PROOF: See Appendix.
This result shows that preference incongruence within oneself is the driving force of mo-
tivation crowding out, which provides an answer to the questionwe set out at the beginning,
i.e., why we ever need to overjustify, rather than justify, our originating motives. To see this,
note that our model is the one of perfectly rational agents where agent A rationally forms
expectations about agent C’s behavior: a change in w changes agent C’s choice of the values,
but any change in the choice is always correctly anticipated by agent A. Our model shows
that what appears to be overjustification can be understood within the framework which
strictly rests on rational behavior, without relying on irrational overjustification, as long as
there is some degree of preference incongruence within one self. In contrast, one can also
argue that the presence of preference incongruence is the necessary condition for motivation
crowding out in the current setup.
4.2.2 Small rewards are detrimental to motivation
Some of recent experiments show that extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic motivation es-
pecially when the rewards are small in magnitude, i.e., no rewards are better than small
rewards (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a). Intuitively, when no rewards are offered at all, the
activity must be done purely for intrinsic motivation. Small rewards are then detrimental
because they shift agent C’s attention more towards the extrinsic value, which makes pref-
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erence incongruence more resounding.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the values are gross substitutes and limy→0 yu
A
2 = 0. Then, motiva-
tion crowding out occurs for any ρ ∈ (0, 1] if w is sufficiently small.
PROOF: See Appendix.
[Figure 3 about here]
This result stems from the fact that motivation crowding out is more likely when yA
and yC are relatively small. To see this, we need to consider both the direct effect and the
indirect effect of changes in the incentive rate w. First, fixing the choice of the values, a unit
increase in w directly raise agent A’s payoff by ρyCuAC2 + (1− ρ)y
AuAA2 , which is positive
by design. Second, a change in w shifts the choice of the values and indirectly affects his
payoff. The second, indirect, effect is negative when the values are gross substitutes, and
motivation crowding out surfaces when the indirect effect dominates the direct effect. It is
then clear that when yA and yC are smaller, the direct effect is weaker and more likely to be
dominated by the indirect effect. Small rewards are then detrimental to motivation because
the marginal payoff from the extrinsic value is low when the incentive rate w is low, making
the direct effect less of a factor.
4.2.3 Intrinsically interesting tasks are susceptible to motivation crowding out
A consensus among social psychologists is that the target task must be intrinsically interest-
ing to observe any effects on intrinsic motivation. Due to this widely held perception, most
experiments in fact examine the effect of external rewards for interesting activities (Ryan et
al., 1983; Deci et al., 1999). To examine this issue, we define
φ(r,w) :=
yC(r,w)
wvC(r,w)
,
and φmax := max(r,w) φ(r,w). When the marginal return to raising y is small, agent C ex-
pends more resources to raise v. We thus take φmax as measuring how intrinsically interest-
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ing the target task is: we say that the task is intrinsically interesting and challenging when
φmax is small.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the values are gross substitutes. Then, motivation crowding out occurs
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1] if φmax is sufficiently small.
PROOF: See Appendix.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a simple dual-self model of human motivation which allows us to in-
quire into the effects of various environmental factors on human motivation. The present
model shows that extrinsic rewards may indeed produce a counterproductive effect and
clarify under what conditions this negative consequence of rewards is more likely to sur-
face. The main findings of the paper are: (i) more autonomy induces more motivation; (ii)
complex tasks are susceptible to motivation crowding out; (iii) small rewards are detrimen-
tal to motivation; (iv) intrinsically interesting tasks are susceptible to motivation crowding
out.
A natural next step is to take the present framework into interpersonal contexts. The
incentive rate w and the degree of autonomy r are noth likely to be under the principal’s
discretion. If the principal cares only about the extrinsic value, e.g., the output, then she
faces an interesting tradeoff. Giving more autonomy to the agent results in the action that is
fun (a high intrinsic value) but not so productive. The cost arising from this distorted choice
of action may, however, be more than compensated by an increase in the agent’s motivation.
This in fact seems to be the tradeoff faced by many managers: the tradeoff between less
control and more motivation. The present framework can be extended to shed light on this
aspect, and it is of some importance to address this issue in future.
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Appendix: proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: An increase in r raises DM’s motivation iff
ρ
(
uAC1
∂vC
∂r
+ wuAC2
∂yC
∂r
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
uAA1
∂vA
∂r
+ wuAA2
∂yA
∂r
)
> 0,
∂vj
∂r
+
∂yj
∂r
= 1, j = A,C.
This can be written as
ρ
(
(uAC1 − wu
AC
2 )
∂vC
∂r
+ wuAC2
)
+ (1− ρ)wuAA2 > 0.
Sincewe already know that uAC1 > wu
AC, this condition holds if ∂vC/∂r > 0, i.e., the intrinsic
value is a normal good.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: An increase in w lowers DM’s motivation iff
ρ
(
uAC1
∂vC
∂w
+ wuAC2
∂yC
∂w
+ yCuAC2
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
uAA1
∂vA
∂w
+wuAA2
∂yA
∂w
+ yAuAA2
)
< 0,
where
∂vj
∂w
+
∂yj
∂w
= 0, j = A,C.
It follows from these that
ρ
(
(uAC1 −wu
AC
2 )
∂vC
∂w
+ yCuAC2
)
+ (1− ρ)yAuAA2 < 0, (2)
As ρ → 1, (2) becomes
(uAC1 −wu
AC
2 )
∂vC
∂w
+ yCuAC2 < 0,
which is further reduced to
(µ(r,w)−w)
∂vC
∂w
+ yC < 0.
Given that the values are gross substitutes, this holds if µ(r,w) is sufficiently large.
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Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: When ρ = 0, (2) is reduced to yAuAA2 > 0, so that this condition
never holds. When µ(r,w) = w for all (r,w), on the other hand, (2) becomes
ρyC + (1− ρ)yA
uAA2
uAC2
< 0,
which never holds either.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Note that as w→ 0, yj → 0. If limy→0 yu
A
2 = 0, (2) becomes
(uAC1 −wu
AC
2 )
∂vC
∂w
< 0,
for any ρ > 0. It is immediate to see that this condition holds if the values are gross substi-
tutes.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: Motivation crowding out occurs if
ρ
(
(µ(r,w)− w)
∂vC
∂w
+ yC
)
+ (1− ρ)yA
uAA2
uAC2
< 0. (3)
Dividing both side of (3) by wvC(r,w) we obtain
ρ
(µ(r,w)−w
wvC(r,w)
∂vC
∂w
+ φ(r,w)
)
+ (1− ρ)
yA
wvC(r,w)
uAA2
uAC2
< 0.
Since yC(r,w) > yA(r,w) for any (r,w), it suffices to show that
ρ
(µ(r,w)− w
wvC(r,w)
∂vC
∂w
+ φ(r,w)
)
+ (1− ρ)φ(r,w)
uAA2
uAC2
< 0.
As φmax → 0, the condition becomes
(µ(r,w)− w)
∂vC
∂w
< 0,
which holds if the values are gross substitutes.
Q.E.D.
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yv
uA = uˆA(0)
uC = u¯C
uA = uˆA(1)
(vC, yC)
(vA, yA)
Figure 1: The equilibrium choice of the values and the corresponding motivation level.
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yv
uA = uˆA(1)
uC = u¯C0
uC = u¯C1
Figure 2: Autonomy enhances motivation (ρ = 1).
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yv
uA = uˆA(1)
uC = u¯C1
uC = u¯C0
Figure 3: The case of motivation crowding out (ρ = 1).
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